8. The Philippines has summarized its claims for arbitration in three categories:

First, China' s assertion of the "historic rights" to the waters, sea-bed and subsoil within the "nine-dash line" (i.e., China' s dotted line in the South China Sea) beyond the limits of its entitlements under the Convention is inconsistent with the Convention.

Second, China' s claim to entitlements of 200 nautical miles and more, based on certain rocks, low-tide elevations and submerged features in the South China Sea, is inconsistent with the Convention.

Third, China' s assertion and exercise of rights in the South China Sea have unlawfully interfered with the sovereign rights, jurisdiction and rights and freedom of navigation that the Philippines enjoys and exercises under the Convention.

9. The subject-matter of the Philippines' claims is in essence one of territorial sovereignty over several maritime features in the South China Sea, which is beyond the scope of the Convention and does not concern the interpretation or application of the Convention. Consequently, the Arbitral Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the claims of the Philippines for arbitration.

10. With regard to the first category of claims presented by the Philippines for arbitration, it is obvious that the core of those claims is that China' s maritime claims in the South China Sea have exceeded the extent allowed under the Convention. However, whatever logic is to be followed, only after the extent of China' s territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea is determined can a decision be made on whether China' s maritime claims in the South China Sea have exceeded the extent allowed under the Convention.

11. It is a general principle of international law that sovereignty over land territory is the basis for the determination of maritime rights. As the International Court of Justice ( "ICJ" ) stated, "maritime rights derive from the coastal State' s sovereignty over the land, a principle which can be summarized as 'the land dominates the sea' " (Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment of 16 March 2001, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 97, para. 185; cf. also North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment of 20 February 1969, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 51, para. 96; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment of 19 December 1978, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 36, para. 86). And, "[i]t is thus the terrestrial territorial situation that must be taken as starting point for the determination of the maritime rights of a coastal State" (Qatar v. Bahrain, I.C.J. Reports 2001, para. 185; Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment of 8 October 2007, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 696, para. 113). Recently the ICJ again emphasized that "[t]he title of a State to the continental shelf and to the exclusive economic zone is based on the principle that the land dominates the sea" , and that "the land is the legal source of the power which a State may exercise over territorial extensions to seaward" (Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment of 19 November 2012, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 51, para. 140).

12. The preamble of the Convention proclaims "the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with due regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans" . It is apparent that "due regard for the sovereignty of all States" is the prerequisite for the application of the Convention to determine maritime rights of the States Parties.