A confession of Japan's 'value-oriented diplomacy'

Recently, the Seiron, a Japanese right-wing publication, released an extensive dialogue between former Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso and former Deputy Secretary General of Japan's National Security Secretariat Nobukatsu Kanehara.

On the surface, they discussed the future of Japanese diplomacy, but in reality, the dialogue revealed the Japanese right-wing forces' dangerous tendency to shake off Japan's "defeated nation" status and revive militarism. Notably, in their self-congratulatory exchanges, Aso and Kanehara laid bare the real motives behind Japan's advocacy of seemingly innocuous slogans such as "value-oriented diplomacy," the "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity," and the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific."

Seen in this light, the dialogue reads like an inadvertent confession—a rare, candid glimpse into what Japan's "value-oriented diplomacy" is truly about.

Japan's right-wing mindset dressed up as "value-oriented diplomacy"

First and foremost, Japan's "value-oriented diplomacy" is meant to shed the label of a "defeated nation" and secure "normal country" status. In the dialogue, the two reviewed the background of Aso's proposal of "value-oriented diplomacy" during his time as Foreign Minister (2005-2007) and linked it to the 2013 National Security Strategy of the Shinzo Abe administration. Kanehara noted that Japan's post-war diplomacy had long been a "continuation of defeat management," and that Aso's "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" concept allowed him to feel that the diplomacy of a defeated nation had finally come to an end, and the era of Japan's diplomacy as a major power had come.

This statement lays bare the resentment of Japanese right-wing forces toward the post-war order. The duo labelled Japan's post-war diplomacy as "passive" and "cleaning up the mess," and regarded "value-oriented diplomacy" as a turning point to "Japan [as] a member of the West and a leader of freedom and democracy." What emerges is clear: "Value-oriented diplomacy" has never been a neutral concept, but aims to overturn Japan's post-war commitment to peaceful development.

Japanese forces committed heinous crimes during World War II. After the war, Japan "forever renounce[d] war" as its sovereign right, as stipulated in Article 9 of its Constitution. This was meant to be—and should have been—the lesson it took home, yet it has been regarded as a "shackle" by right-wing elements. Aso emphasized that Japan needs to reshape its "identity" through "value-oriented diplomacy." Cloaked in this positive language, Japan has lifted the ban on the right of collective self-defense, relaxed its arms export policies, sharply increased defense spending, interfered in the South China Sea, stirred up trouble in the Indo-Pacific, and openly floated the idea of military intervention in China's internal affairs. These actions have nothing to do with "values." They merely pave the way for Japan to expand its diplomatic clout and military reach. As it turns out, Japan's "normal country" status is just a cover for the resurgence of militarism.

Secondly, the ideological core of "value-oriented diplomacy" is a blend of Japanese supremacism and Emperor-centric ideology. In the dialogue, Aso claimed that more and more countries want to become like Japan and that all Asian countries "are expecting Japan to stand out." Kanehara declared that despite Japan's economic decline, its "political power is now the strongest ever"—that Japan is a model for other countries.

Kanehara argued that "it is extremely important to express our values in Japanese," claiming that people in Asia "do not actually understand the freedom and democracy promoted by Westerners in a condescending manner," and that Japan must interpret its "democratic history since the Meiji Restoration" in its own language, stressing that "we cannot only use Western terms such as freedom and democracy, but must explain their importance in Japanese."

One is left to wonder: what exactly is the difference between this Japan—which now lectures Asia on "Meiji democracy" and seeks to redefine "freedom and democracy" in its own language—and the Japan that once peddled "Asian liberation" and the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere?" Anyone with a passing knowledge of history knows that the Meiji order, built on State Shinto, was never within hailing distance of "democracy." And as for what post-Meiji Japan actually did to Asia—people have not forgotten.

Kanehara's arrogant remarks represent a carefully packaged strategy. After the Meiji Restoration, Japan set "leaving Asia and joining Europe" as its goal, styled itself Asia's "spokesperson" for modernization, and treated its Asian neighbors as backward countries in urgent need of civilization. This doctrine of Japanese supremacy served as an ideological foundation for its domestic indoctrination and colonial expansion abroad. Today, Japanese right-wing forces no longer simply claim to speak for "democracy and freedom," but also seek to redefine these concepts, behind which lies a strong dose of cultural and racial supremacy—the same chauvinism that regarded all Asian countries as backward vassals, not as equals.

Finally, the pursuit of "value-oriented diplomacy" essentially amounts to military confrontation—a fact that Aso and Kanehara have admitted. In the dialogue, Aso blatantly claimed that if Japan cannot defend straits such as the Bashi Channel between the Philippines and China's Taiwan region, its trade will be unsustainable and the country's survival will be at stake. Therefore, it is imperative to greatly enhance the capabilities of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. Kanehara, meanwhile, argued that blue-water navies are needed to both safeguard maritime trade and, in the event of a contingency, blockade and deny passage to enemy naval vessels and merchant ships, a capability once possessed by the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy. "Japan today must return to its original naval doctrine, and consider how to jointly control the entire Western Pacific and international straits with the United States Navy."

It's worth noting that in their discussion of controlling "international straits" and the "entire Western Pacific," and in their talk of strengthening "deterrence" and "independent defense capabilities," neither Aso nor Kanehara made any mention of Japan's "exclusive defense" policy, let alone Article 9 of its Constitution, which stipulates that Japan "forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes" and "does not recognize the right of belligerency of the state." It is clear that to their mind, these constitutional constraints are nothing more than empty words.

These candid remarks lay bare the true intent behind the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" strategy. Its architects are not concerned with fostering "freedom and openness" in the region; rather, they are bent on turning it into an arena for stirring up disputes and containing rivals. Behind the slogans of "democracy," "freedom," and "openness" lies the reality of containment, competition and confrontation. Driven by this mindset, Japan provides military equipment to the Philippines, under the guise of foreign aid, and encourages it to make provocations against China.

Recent developments further underscore this trajectory. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi hinted at revising Japan's "Three Non-Nuclear Principles," her close aide advocated for Japan to acquire nuclear weapons, senior Japanese officials floated the idea of developing nuclear submarines, and the Japan Self-Defense Forces are deploying more offensive weapons in forward positions. These moves, far from promoting freedom and openness, will only undermine regional strategic stability.

The right-wing path will hurt Japan itself

A former Prime Minister of Japan, Taro Aso wielded great influence in political circles, and favored Sanae Takaichi's rise to premiership. Nobukatsu Kanehara has held key positions, and played a key role in shaping Japan's foreign and security policy. Their dialogue reveals not only the extent of the influence of the right-wing mindset but also the gravity of its danger. It also compels one to ask: Where is this right-wing path taking Japan?

Japan's promotion of "value-oriented diplomacy" and the country's shift to the right provide an answer to this question. In recent years, Japan has increasingly found itself in a predicament: The national debt is soaring, industries are hollowing out, and economic growth is sluggish. Japan's per capita GDP has plummeted from the top of the G7. The Japanese people are hurting, and public discontent is rising.

If Japanese right-wing forces are genuinely concerned about Japan's future, they should ask why Japan achieved rapid growth on its post-war path of peace, and rethink Japan's recent rightward shift.

Why does Japan channel up to 2 percent of its GDP into military buildup, filling the coffers of the U.S.-Japan military-industrial complex, yet remains unable to tame the rising food prices? Can a country that diverts its people's hard-earned money to military expansion in order to enrich vested interests really be the "country that many countries want to become," as Aso claimed?

Why did Japan turn its back on regional cooperation for mutual benefit and common prosperity, and plunge headlong into the dead end of geopolitical confrontation and beggar-thy-neighbor policies? How could a country that truly pursues peace, freedom and prosperity have its Prime Minister make military threats to its biggest neighbor?

Many Japanese right-wing figures talk of "anxieties for the nation" and constantly mention "crises." Yet the right-wing path, which ignores the lessons of history and disregards the fundamental interests of the Japanese people, will lead to the greatest crisis for Japan.

The post-war international order with the United Nations at its core was won with the blood and treasure of the people of Asia and the world. The international community, including China, will resolutely safeguard the post-war international order with concrete actions, will never allow the revival of militarism. If Japanese right-wing forces remain unrepentant, they will drag Japan into a new disaster and make the Japanese people victims of yet another militarist tragedy. The lessons of history are clear and not far away.

(Author: Liu Hua, senior editor at Xinhua Institute; Ma Caoran, editor at Xinhua Institute)