Given China's strategic interests, especially in terms of its need to defend seaborne commerce, it's only logical that China is extending its reach into the Indian Ocean.
If you are dependent upon seaborne commerce and if you're not comfortable with your dependence on another power's ability to dictate your access to the seas, then you're going to want to develop your own capabilities to protect the sea lanes yourself.
That's a perfectly logical and legitimate security interest. China is going to seek access points, if not bases, for its military vessels to pull in for refueling, resupply and so on.
Sri Lanka is a perfectly logical place located roughly midway between the Persian Gulf and the South China Sea in the very vast Indian Ocean. China is going to want to have more access points along the Indian Ocean littoral.
The US should continue to look for areas where it can cooperate with China, like on anti-piracy and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, in the Indian Ocean.
There is a whole range of naval missions where the two powers could cooperate. If China's far seas mission is about maintaining good order at sea, then that's one area where navy-to-navy cooperation will come very naturally.
In the near seas, the situation is very competitive, verging on rivalry, between China and the US. In the far seas, there seems to be a convergence of interests. What we have is a very dichotomous maritime relationship.
China is doing things that the US welcomes, such as anti-piracy patrols to maintain good order at sea, in the far seas.
But China is adopting what the US considers to be a more closed approach in the near seas.
It's interesting that in 2009 when we had the Impeccable incident in the near seas, US and Chinese naval officers were simultaneously toasting each other during the anti-piracy patrols in the far seas. That's a perfect example of this much more complex, dichotomous relationship.
Can we cooperate on some of these far seas issues and agree on overcoming the differences over the near seas? My view is that the near seas are much more important to China.
And, the disputes over the near seas relate to matters of principle.
They are thus going to override the cooperative dynamics emerging in the Indian Ocean.
The US should not, in principle, object to China's search for access points along the Indian Ocean littorals.
We should understand that's just, by nature, something that a growing navy would want to do.
Strategically, China's presence in the Indian Ocean could also potentially make it more vulnerable, because these assess points would be strung out far from China's coast, and Chinese naval forces would have to defend them far from home waters.
That could present an opportunity for the US, allowing the US navy to cut off Chinese access to these points.
So you could see efforts to outflank each other in the Indian Ocean. If China builds access points there, the US will strengthen its position in Diego Garcia or Bahrain to try to outflank the Chinese in the Indian Ocean.
Australia, too, will play an increasingly bigger role. It's no wonder that Australia wants to allow US naval access to Perth in western Australia, facing the Indian Ocean, so that US forces can swing forces to the Indian Ocean. Larger geopolitical maneuvering is already taking place.
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