Vietnam's political reform has been growing roots in the last couple of years. This socialist nation has carried out several new policies, stirring discussions about whether Vietnam is designing a top-down transformation.
In November 2012, the National Assembly, Vietnam's legislative body, approved the newly amended Anti-Corruption Law, enforcing Vietnamese public officials to declare their assets within a certain period of time every year.
This April, media reported that Vietnam was intending to change its official name from "the Socialist Republic of Vietnam" to "the Democratic Republic of Vietnam," and that the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) would be deprived of its absolute leadership.
Two months later, Vietnam proposed a vote of confidence to the officials of the central government, which included Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung.
Such moves have drawn a lot of attention around the world. Conjectures have arisen, claiming the nation is about to go through another "revolution" in ideology and governance.
It has been argued that Vietnam is throwing itself on a path to "Western democracy," and moving away from the traditional "socialist path." Some political analysts even concluded that Vietnam has already surpassed China in political reform.
But digging into Vietnam's political reform would make people find that under "democratic" appearances, Vietnam is and will still keep a firm grip on its socialist nature and the one-party ruling system. And the "surpassing China" conclusion is nothing but an immature surmise.
First, a vote of confidence is truly a pioneering activity in Vietnam as well as in the whole socialist sphere. It is believed to be Vietnam's attempt at reforming its political system in order to build a "socialist law-based state." However, this vote mechanism left a lot of room for maneuver when it was initially formulated. Impeachment, the best way to ensure a vote of confidence is effective, has very little chance of actually happening. The policy has more symbolic meaning than any practical significance.
Second, the asset declaration rules are set to curb bribery and corruption, but considering previous practices, this law may hardly be strictly enforced, especially since the declarations are only made within the government and not the public.
A lack of effective supervision and binding force will mean that the new rules can have very limited effect.
Third, it should be noted that the so-called name-change matter has also been hyped up by Vietnamese dissidents.
By taking advantage of the opportunity that the National Assembly is going to amend the constitution, 72 dissidents jointly drafted an unofficial amendment, proposing to invalidate the CPV's leadership over the state and the military and to remove "socialist" from the country's name.
These claims have already been declined by the National Assembly, but the media's hype has twisted the truth, even using it as an insinuation of China's political reform.
Vietnam's political reform has truly been accelerated since the ruling party's 10th national congress in 2006. The National Assembly, Fatherland Front and many social organizations have been empowered to play bigger roles in Vietnamese politics, and inner-party democracy has also been improved.
This trend, however, should not be defined as a "self-destructive" attempt by the CPV to subvert the state system and end its own rule.
The purpose of the reform is to improve the socialist market economy by breaking down the institutional barriers that impede Vietnam's economic development.
Indeed, Hanoi is facing multiple challenges, such as intensified peaceful evolution from the West, declining authority of the ruling party, and increasing strikes, land disputes and protests. Whether Vietnam's political reform can work as expected lies in whether these challenges can be handled properly.
The author is a research fellow at the Academy of Marxism, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn
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