This will be a serious test for Western policies, but even more so for the Russian Federation. A three-dimensional (economic, political and information/cultural) competition with a much stronger adversary will require Russia to mobilize all its available resources. It will also expose the flaws of Russia's present system. As a result, Russia could either re-emerge as a nation with a strong sense of patriotism, or it could break up again.

Future Western, particularly European sanctions can push Russia to seek compensation through strengthening economic ties with Asian countries. China is obviously the leading candidate, but Moscow hopes that others in the region, such as Japan, South Korea and Singapore, despite supporting the US verbally, will continue, and even expand, their trading links with Russia.

Politically, Moscow knows it will have to stand alone on the Crimea issue. It has been through this before, over South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008, and does not seem to mind much. Russian President Vladimir Putin believes he is doing the right thing, by helping Russians to come back to Russia, and this is what matters.

Moscow has certainly noted Beijing's sole abstention during the UN Security Council vote on the Crimea referendum. The Russians understand China's concern about the principles of territorial integrity and non-interference, but they also realize that Beijing is not comfortable with Washington's geopolitical interests in the region. This calls for continued close partnership, but not for a military alliance.

Essentially, the Russians believe that it is the interests of the various countries-the US, China, Russia and others-that inform their behaviors, and that it is the power relationships among the leading members of the international community which set the rules of the game. Moscow has long been unhappy about some of the rules set after the end of the Cold War, such as the West's dominance, but now it feels strong and confident enough to challenge them.

The post-Cold War era seems to be over as we enter what could be renamed the inter-Cold War era.

The author is the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center and editor-in-chief of its daily blog, the Eurasia Outlook.