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 | Sunday, April 30, 2000, updated at 15:42(GMT+8) | ||||||||||||
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Full Text of Statement by Sha at 2000 Review Conference of NPTThe following is the full text of statement made by Chinese H.E. Amb. Sha Zukang April 24 in New York at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.Mr. President, First of all, I wish to extend, on behalf of the Chinese Delegation, our sincere congratulations to you upon your election as the President of this Conference. I am confident that with your wisdom, talent and rich diplomatic experience, you will lead the conference to a success. I would like to assure you of my delegation's full support and cooperation in your work. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to Amb. Pasi Patokallio of Finland, Amb. Tadeusz Strulak of Poland and Amb. Camilo Reyes Rodriguez of Colombia, Chairmen of the past three sessions of the Preparatory Committee, for the valuable work they have done. Mr. President, At the beginning of the new millennium, while hopeful for the future, we are deeply aware of the heavy responsibilities on our shoulders. In the course of the development of human history, the advancement of science and technology and the spread of knowledge have led us out of ignorance and backwardness and have brought about civilization and progress. However, on its road towards the prosperity and happiness, mankind has suffered repeated scourges of war. The two world wars in the twentieth century left mankind with memories of blood and tears. Later on, the confrontation between the eastern and western blocs caused people to live under the shadow of danger of the war during the Cold War period which lasted for more than forty years. With such bitter experience, people all the more long for peace and stability. The achievement of lasting peace and sustainable development have become the common desire of the people of the world. After the end of Cold War, there was, for a period of time, some relaxation of tension in the international situation. But peace has not been achieved in the world. Recently, there has been an increase of unstable and uncertain elements in the international security. The world is undergoing the most profound and complicated changes since the end of Cold War. It should be noted that even though the Cold War has come to an end, yet the Cold War mentality still lingers on. Military alliances have been strengthened, hegemonism and power politics manifest themselves from time to time, and a small group of countries advocate the so-called "humanitarian intervention", by which, they violate state sovereignty. They went so far as to use force against a sovereign state, bypassing the United Nations. Such acts not only seriously undermined the world peace and stability and grossly trampled upon the international law and the norms governing international relations, but also caused unprecedented challenge to the collective security system with UN at its core, formed after the two world wars. In order to enhance its strategic superiority and establish its own absolute security, a certain country has stepped up the development, deployment and proliferation of its advanced ballistic missile defense system, thus posing a severe threat to the global strategic balance and stability. In some regions, forces of ethnic separatism and religious extremism are on the rise, which not only jeopardizes the regional peace, but also adds new elements of instability to the international security. These developments not only cause the increase of military factors in the international relations and a decline in the sense of security among countries, but also seriously undermine the trust and cooperation in the field of international arms control. The positive momentum which emerged in the field of arms control and non-proliferation after the end of the Cold War has been seriously setback, and the international non-proliferation regime has suffered repeated and heavy blows. The prospect of the disarmament process is a cause for great concern. So, it is against this background that the current Review Conference is taking place. It is a very important conference, the outcome of which will have a direct impact on the future and fate of the international non-proliferation regime and the nuclear disarmament process. It is therefore the responsibility of all State Parties gathered here to ensure the success of this Conference. The aim of a review conference should be to take stock of the past and plan for the future. Now, in light of the current international situation in arms control and disarmament, I would like to elaborate the positions of the Chinese Delegation on the three objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), namely, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Mr. President, Just as the Treaty's name suggests, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is naturally one of the major goals of the NPT. In 1995, we agreed on the indefinite extension of the Treaty, which represents a significant milestone in the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation, promotion of nuclear disarmament process and realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world. However, it is regrettable that, only three years later, the nuclear explosions, first in Rajasthan and then in Baluchistan cast a dark shadow over the future of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The international community responded strongly. UN Security Council Resolution 1172 established the correct principle and direction for the solution to the nuclear issue in South Asia. It is regrettable, however, that little substantive progress has registered and Resolution 1172 has yet to be implemented. We have taken note of the fact that the two countries in South Asia declared that they would conduct "no more new nuclear tests" or "would not be the first to conduct new nuclear tests" and "would not impede the entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)". We urge the two countries to honour their commitments. At the same time, it should be stressed that Resolution 1172 reflects the common will of the international community on the South Asia nuclear issue, therefore the authority and integrity of the Resolution must be safeguarded. The two countries should fully implement the resolution at an early date. As a State Party to the NPT, China has all along taken a serious and responsible attitude towards nuclear non-proliferation. China is firmly opposed to any form of proliferation of nuclear weapons to any other country. China adheres to the policy of not advocating, encouraging or engaging in nuclear weapons proliferation. We do not help any other country develop nuclear weapons, nor provide assistance to any nuclear facilities outside IAEA safeguards. China has abided by the three principles of nuclear exports, i.e., the export is used solely for peaceful purposes; it must be subjected to IAEA safeguards; and the export should not be transferred to a third country without China's permission. In order to strengthen and improve the control mechanism for nuclear export, the Chinese government respectively promulgated the Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Export on September 10, 1997 and the Regulation on the Control of Nuclear dual-Use Items and Related Technologies Export promulgated on June 1, 1998. Moreover, China joined the Zangger Committee, an international nuclear export control system, in October 1997. China has also participated in the negotiations of the "93+2" Protocol aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system. China signed the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between China and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in China on December 31, 1998. Mr. President, With the advancement of science and technology, the deepening of the globalization process and the advent of the information age, there will be more and more difficulties to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. Practice shows that it is impossible to realize the goal of non-proliferation only by the traditional means of blocking or suppression. How to effectively prevent the nuclear weapons proliferation under the new circumstance? This must be answered by the whole international community. China is of the view that further efforts should be made in the following three areas in order to address the non-proliferation issue. Firstly, establishing a global security environment of stability, cooperation and mutual trust, which will be the basic guarantee for the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation. It is known to all that an important reason for some countries to allocate huge financial resources to the development of weapons of mass destruction is the lack of a sense of security and the need to seek an effective way for self protection. The establishment of a favorable international environment, the insistence on the peaceful solution of international disputes and security for all the members of the international community will help remove the motives of some countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Secondly, to abolish double or multi-standards in the field of nuclear non-proliferation is the prerequisite for the success of nuclear non-proliferation. The purpose of nuclear non-proliferation should be the enhancement of the security of all states. The implementation of the NPT should be used as the sole criterion. Non-proliferation must not just serve the security interest of a small number of countries. Much less should the likes or dislikes of a country be taken as a criterion for judgement. Otherwise, the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime would be undermined and the extensive support lost. Thirdly, in the framework of collective security, the enhancement of international unity, cooperation and common efforts is the only correct and effective way to solve the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Without the cooperation with other countries, no country, no matter how strong it is, can reach the goal of non-proliferation by only relying on its own power and the power of its allies. Any trend or action of unilateralism runs counter to the main tide of the non-proliferation efforts. Mr. President, The Nuclear-Weapon States must faithfully implement their obligations for nuclear disarmament. This is the necessary guarantee for the maintenance of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The indefinite extension of the NPT unconditionally agreed upon by the non-nuclear-weapon states by no means endorses the indefinite right to own nuclear weapons by the Nuclear-Weapon States. The emergence and development of nuclear weapons not only results from the technological development, it owes even more to the international security environment and the perception of security by each country. Nuclear weapons came into being in the latter part of World War II and were developed during the Cold War period marked by the eastern and western blocs confrontation and mistrust. The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed the end of the Cold War, the relaxation of tension of the world and the improvement of relations among major countries along with some significant progress made in the international nuclear disarmament process. The US and Russia (the former Soviet Union) concluded some treaties on nuclear arms reduction such as the INF Treaty, START I and START II. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was finally reached after many years of painstaking efforts by the international community. Due to the changes in the international security situation since 1990s, the international nuclear disarmament process has once again bogged down to a standstill. The bilateral nuclear disarmament treaties between the US and Russia are sluggish in their ratification and implementation and the US senate even refused to ratify the CTBT. It is gratifying to see that the Duma of the Russian Federation has finally ratified the START II treaty recently after several years of twists and turns. We look forward to its early implementation of this treaty and the initiation of the START III negotiations. China is of the view that nuclear disarmament should be a comprehensive and irreversible process. If only reducing obsolete nuclear weapons while enhancing nuclear capability, or reducing the number of deployed nuclear weapons while putting the reduced nuclear warheads into the so-called "inactive reserve" that keeps to be maintained or even renewed, ready for redeployment at anytime, such practice are by no means genuine nuclear disarmament. It should be particularly stressed that global nuclear disarmament can not be reached without the global strategic balance. President Jiang Zemin pointed out at the Conference on Disarmament in March last year that the so-called missile defense programme "will inevitably exert an extensive negative impact on international security and stability and trigger off a new round of arms race in new areas, thereby seriously obstructing or neutralizing international efforts of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation". President Jiang also urged the international community to take necessary measures to preempt such dangerous developments. We have noticed that when the Russian Federation ratified the START II, it declared that if the United States undermines the 1972 ABM treaty, that would prompt Moscow to withdraw from START II as well as all the other arms control agreements. History shows that, as the cornerstone of the global strategic balance and stability, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty concluded in 1972 has provided the necessary security framework for the USA and Russia cut down their nuclear stockpiles and played an indispensable and crucial role in assuring the continuous progress in their bilateral nuclear disarmament process. Relying on its overwhelmingly superior strength in economy, science and technology, a certain military power, notwithstanding its large nuclear arsenals with overkill capability, is vigorously pursuing the development of national missile defense (NMD) system in an attempt to seek absolute security for itself. Regardless whether an absolute security is achievable, such action is tantamount to nuclear arms build-up, which will not only bring severe damage to the integrity and vitality of the ABM treaty and the global strategic balance and stability, but also seriously disrupt the basis for the US-Russia bilateral nuclear reductions, impede the international nuclear disarmament process, thus shatter the prerequisite and basis for international nuclear non-proliferation. Russia's ratification of START II and CTBT has let in a light of hope for the nuclear disarmament process and we hope that the countries concerned can seize this opportunity and get back on the right track of arms control and disarmament, a track has been proven feasible in the decade after the end of Cold War. Mr. President, China's nuclear weapons are solely for the purpose of self-defense. It has therefore always practiced utmost restraint in its nuclear weapons development. Starting from the first day it came into possession of nuclear weapons, China has unconditionally undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Also without any condition, it has committed itself not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China has never evaded its responsibilities and obligations for nuclear disarmament and has been advocating the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In all seriousness and with responsibility, it participated in the CTBT negotiations and was among the first to sign that Treaty. The Chinese Government has formally submitted the Treaty to the National People's Congress for examination and ratification. In the meantime, it must be emphasized that there are two basic prerequisites for China to participate in any arms control negotiations, nuclear arms control in particular, namely, these negotiations and ensuring the treaties or agreements must not compromise the global strategic balance and stability, nor undermine China's national security interests. In defiance of the strong opposition from the international community, a certain country is bent on developing the NMD disruptive to the global strategic stability. This and other profound changes that have taken place recently in the international security environment will inevitably affect China's arms control policy. The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) should be conducive to the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation and the promotion of nuclear disarmament. Based on this understanding, China supports the conclusion of a FMCT through negotiations. However, China is of the view that, at a time when a certain country is determined to develop a missile defense system using the outer space as its important base, the prevention of the weaponization of outer space is a task even more urgent than the FMCT negotiation. Therefore, the three major disarmament issues of outer space, nuclear disarmament and FMCT should at least be dealt with by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva in a reasonable and balanced manner. As a matter of fact, whether CD can treat these three issues in a balanced way has become a matter of principle rather than only of procedure. At stake is whether each country's legitimate security concerns can be equally addressed at the CD, the only forum for multilateral disarmament negotiation. Disarmament should be conducive to the enhancement of all countries' common security, never becoming a tool employed by a few States to strengthen their military superiority and weaken or restrict other countries. At present, nuclear transparency is quite a topic in the field of arms control. China holds that, as an integral part of the efforts for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, certain transparency measures are necessary if warranted. However, under the present circumstances, whether time and conditions are ripe for taking these transparency measures and whether they can enhance mutual trust as expected, are questions worth pondering. Nuclear-Weapon States have differed a lot in their nuclear strategies and arsenals, therefore it is unreasonable to ask these countries to take the same transparency measures at the same time. Furthermore, what degree of transparency in the military field can a country accept is directly related to its strategic security environment. Today, a superpower which rampantly intervenes in other countries' internal affairs and willfully resorts to force, is continuously improving its overwhelming first-strike nuclear capability. On the other hand, it also spares no efforts in developing an advanced missile defense system capable of neutralizing any counter-strike launched by a small- or medium-sized Nuclear-Weapon State after sustaining a nuclear first strike. Under such circumstances, it is neither conducive to their own security nor in the interest of global strategic balance and stability to ask the small- or medium-sized nuclear countries to take transparency measures. We believe that the most rational and feasible confidence-building measures now are that Nuclear Weapon States unconditionally undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. Although the ban on the first use of nuclear weapons can not substitute the concrete nuclear disarmament measures, it will increase the mutual trust among Nuclear Weapon States as well as between the Nuclear Weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, reduce the risk of nuclear war and help decrease discriminatory nature inherent in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. As a result, the universality and effectiveness of the regime will be enhanced, leading toward the necessary conditions for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. Mr. President, Promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy is one of the three objectives of the NPT. Nuclear power is a clean and highly efficient energy with tremendous potentials. Nuclear technology has been widely applied in many aspects of human life. As a developing country with certain capabilities in nuclear industry, China adheres to the relevant provisions of the NPT and actively carries out mutually beneficial international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. China has signed agreements of cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy with governments of sixteen countries including the Russian Federation, France and others. China has also helped developing countries in the fields of nuclear power, nuclear medical science and the application of nuclear technologies. In the multilateral field, China has carried out fruitful cooperation and exchanges with the IAEA in areas of nuclear power plant construction, nuclear safety, management of nuclear wastes and the application of nuclear technologies. In addition to making timely and full payments to the Technical Assistance Fund (TCF) of the Agency, China has also provided extra-budgetary resources. From time to time, the scientific and technical personnel from developing countries come to China for survey and training. Upon request by the IAEA, China also dispatches experts to provide technical services and give lectures to transregional projects or international symposium. China has actively participated in the cooperation of nuclear science and technologies in Asia and the Pacific, making great contributions to promoting the peaceful use of nuclear technology in this region. In order to fully implement the obligations of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the international cooperation as set forth in the NPT, China advocates the further strengthening of the technical assistance to the developing countries, lifting various unreasonable limits regards nuclear technology transfer to developing countries, and actively supporting developing countries to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with a view to making nuclear energy beneficial to whole mankind. Every country has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy are complementary to each other. To strengthen the international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and expanding the application of nuclear technology will not only promote a country's economic development, improve its people's living standard, but also help prevent nuclear weapon proliferation. But if the desire and demand for peaceful uses of nuclear energy from developing countries are ignored, while the nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear export control are over emphasized and normal peaceful uses of nuclear energy among various countries are impeded under the pretext of nuclear non-proliferation, it will not only deviate from the original aims of the NPT but also bring harm to the interests of the countries concerned. If this happens, the nuclear non-proliferation regime will not last for lack of support. Certain States have categorized the world according to their preferences. They call some countries they dislike by a host of weird names, such as "rogue states" and have grossly deprived the latter of the right for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These double-standard or multi-standard conducts are extremely unfair and irresponsible. They will not help solve the concerns for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but only deepen the mistrust among countries, causing disappointment and doubt about the present nuclear non-proliferation regime on the part of various countries, especially the developing countries. Mr. President, NPT is the most important international treaty on arms control and has the widest representation. Now the international situation is undergoing great changes and disarmament efforts are at a critical crossroad. Under such circumstances, it is of great importance to ensure the success of this Conference for the benefit of reinforcing the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, promoting the international nuclear disarmament and enhancing world peace and stability. It is China's sincere hope that a final document can be produced by consensus at the end of the conference, which will mark the success of the Conference. As for the final document, it is not important whether it is one paper divided into two parts of reviewing and forward-looking or two separate papers. What is important is that the document should give an accurate evaluation of the implementation of the Treaty in the past five years and make practical arrangements on what goals should be reached in the next five years. It is the first review conference since the indefinite extension in 1995 and we should cherish such a historic opportunity, overcome various kinds of negative elements and strive for a consensus on all major issues with a prudent, responsible and flexible attitude, so as to establish a good foundation for the future review and implementation of the Treaty. Mr. President, I would like to wrap up my speech by quoting a paragraph from the statement of Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen at the United Nations General Assembly in 1994: "Since mankind has been able to make nuclear weapons and tap nuclear energy for peaceful purpose in the 20th century, we are confident that in the 21st century they will certainly be able to completely ban and destroy nuclear weapons and fully harness nuclear energy to enhance their own welfare". It is not an inaccessible goal. The key lies in whether there is enough political will for each and every country to realize this goal. We have entered the twenty-first century and it is up to us to choose whether to live under the shadow of nuclear weapon threat or in the sunlight of peace and happiness. May all the peace and freedom-loving people in the world join hands to strive for a nuclear-weapon-free world! Thank you, Mr. President.
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