Last updated at: (Beijing Time) Friday, January 09, 2004
Politicking takes the centrestage
A mainland-based Taiwanese correspondent once joked that they are more conscious about what colour they are instead of what is right or wrong "what he meant was that it denotes political identity, or which political camp a person belongs to.
A mainland-based Taiwanese correspondent once joked that they are more conscious about what colour they are instead of what is right or wrong "what he meant was that it denotes political identity, or which political camp a person belongs to.
Since grabbing power in May 2000, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) chaired by Taiwan "president'' Chen Shui-bian has established an alliance with the Taiwan Solidarity Union to form the so-called pan-green camp.
The two parties have joined efforts to pursue a separatist agenda and fight against the pan-blue camp, which consists of the opposition Kuomintang Party (KMT), People First Party and New Party.
The pan-blue camp has held out for keeping Taiwan's status quo and focusing on resurrecting the island's flagging economy.
But the pan-green camp has tried hard to paint itself as comprising reformists who love and work for the island while labelling those in the pan-blue camp as sympathizers of the Communist mainland who want to sell out Taiwan.
"Due to the strong political ideology of Chen and his party, Taiwan has been dragged into an era dominated by inter-party infighting,'' says Zhu Weidong, assistant director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
He notes that the election-minded leader has resorted to pro-independence ideology in almost all major policies, which in turn has stirred up strife and confrontation among different ethnic groups, natives and non-natives on the island.
"Chen has been attempting to promote populism to split the Taiwanese society and undermine social harmony with a view to serve his own pursuit of power,'' Zhu says.
Because of his preoccupation with political games, Chen's nearly four years in office have been characterized by flip-flopping policies, a sagging economy, soaring unemployment and rising tension in cross-Straits ties.
As the incompetent DPP administration has failed to come up with substantial and effective measures to rejuvenate the island's economy, Taiwan has yet to bail itself out of the lingering economic woes.
Sagging economy
Over the past four years under Chen's leadership, Taiwan's annual economic growth rate averaged only between 2 and 3 per cent.
In 2001, the island's gross domestic product grew by a negative 2.92 per cent "the first negative growth in 50 years.
Given the DPP administration's increased purchases of sophisticated weapons to guarantee its pro-independence push, Taiwan's budget deficit rose from 142.5 billion new Taiwan dollars (US$4.75 billion) in 2001 to 238.1 billion new Taiwan dollars (US$7.936 billion) in 2003.
A recent survey by the former ruling KMT suggested about 1.36 million Taiwanese families now live on debt and 12 million out of the island's total 23 million people are categorized as the "new poor class.''
Meanwhile, the sluggish economic development has also greatly worsened the island's unemployment problem, with the jobless rate soaring from 2.8 per cent in 2000 to 4.71 per cent in November last year.
Fed up with Chen's political bankruptcy and policy faults, a tremendous number of Taiwanese people including farmers, workers, students, teachers and even township officials have been taking to the streets to vent their anger.
In November 2002, some 120,000 farmers and fishermen from all over the island demonstrated in Taipei to protest controversial reforms of rural credit unions and co-operatives.
As for the mainland policy, Chen has gone all out to damage bilateral ties despite his earlier vow to improve cross-Straits relations, according to Xu Bodong, director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies at Beijing Union University.
"Out of his deep-rooted splittist mentality, Chen has been bent on promoting a de-sinofication policy through a series of creeping pro-independence moves,'' he says.
When taking office on May 20, 2000, Chen said he would follow the "four no's and one have not,'' which require Taiwan to refrain from declaring independence, changing the "national title,'' including the concept of "state-to-state'' relations between the island and the mainland in its "constitution,'' or promoting any referendum on changing the status quo in regard to independence.
Empty talk
But without any intention to put his words into action, Chen has since repeatedly engaged in "empty talk'' to mislead and deceive the public.
Only one month later, the leader publicly denied the existence of the "992 consensus'' and refused to embrace the one-China principle that there is only one China in the world; and that both Taiwan and the mainland are part of China.
Under the 1992 agreement, reached orally between the mainland's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and the island's Straits Exchange Foundation in November 1992, the two sides of the Straits both adhere to the one-China principle.
After managing to destroy the political basis for resuming cross-Straits negotiations, Chen went further to promote gradual Taiwan independence, aimed at separating the island's culture from the Chinese culture in the ideological, cultural and educational sectors.
One typical example is the attempt by Taiwan's "executive yuan,'' or the cabinet, to adopt the indigenous Tongyong system for romanizing Chinese characters instead of Beijing's Hanyu Pinyin system, which is more widely used in the rest of the world.
The move to use the Tongyong system, invented by a group of Taiwan linguists who say their version accommodates the pronunciation of dialects such as Taiwanese and Hakka, is nothing but another attempt to carve out a separate identity from the mainland.
Then the DPP administration decided to add "Taiwan'' on the cover of its "passports'' as part of Chen's broader effort to separate Taiwan from China and finally realize his separatist dream.
The leader has been reluctant to take any practical steps to push ahead with the establishment of the three direct links across the Straits, which has been strongly called for by the public, especially the business community.
Despite Chen's pledge that the implementation of the three links is "a road we must take,'' his administration has yet to lift the five-decade ban on direct postal, trade and transport services between Taiwan and the mainland.
Public support eroded
Wu Nengyuan, director of the Institute of Modern Taiwan Studies under the Fujian Academy of Social Sciences, says Chen's poor performance during his rule has already eroded public support for him as well as his party.
The latest poll by the island's mass-circulation United Daily suggests the public's approval rate of the DPP administration has now dived to 31 per cent from 51 per cent in June 2000; at the same time, the disapproval rate has climbed to as high as 53 per cent from 21 per cent at that time.
Wu says the declining support has prompted Chen to embark on a more radical campaign for advocacy of separatism to boost his chances of re-election in March.
"Realizing that he has few economic achievements to boast about, Chen has to concentrate on the most sensitive political issue, not least about cross-Straits ties, in a bid to woo votes,'' the researcher said.
"To choose such a political agenda is not only one of Chen's main electoral strategies but also his key plot to push for formal independence.''
On August 3, 2002, Chen began to preach "one country on each side (of the Taiwan Straits)'', triggering new tensions in bilateral ties.
Chen's remarks echoed the notorious "two states'' theory put forward by his predecessor Lee Teng-hui in July 1999 in which he defined relations across the Taiwan Straits as "state-to-state''.
With the election approaching, the Taiwan leader upped the ante by proposing the holding of referendums and the writing of a new "constitution'' under the guise of promoting democracy.
He remained defiant even after the opposition-dominated "legislative yuan,'' or the island's top legislature, passed a watered-down version of the referendum law to partially block plebiscites on independence.
In late November, Chen dropped a political bombshell by taking advantage of the loophole in the referendum bill to hold the so-called "defensive referendum'' on the same day as the "presidential'' elections.
'Defensive referendum"
The "defensive referendum'' clause enshrined in Taiwan's referendum bill gives the island leader the power to ask for a referendum on "national'' security matters when the island faces an imminent external threat that could cause a change in "national sovereignty.''
Chen reportedly argued that a "defensive referendum'' should be pre-emptive by nature; otherwise it would be of no use.
The Taiwanese people would be allowed to vote on whether they want to formally demand the mainland to remove hundreds of missiles aimed at the island, Chen told a campaign rally in the northern city of Hsinchu on November 30.
Wu says Chen has deliberately tried to play up the mainland's military deployment, which targets only separatist forces.
Beijing has long made it clear that the use of force is mainly meant to deter pro-independence attempts by separatist forces on the island and intervention from foreign forces, according to Wu.
"Logically, the pursuit of Taiwan independence is the only real threat to the island because there would never be the use of force if there were no separatist activities on the island,'' he says.
The researcher adds that only a handful of die-hard separatists like Chen who are hatching the pro-independence conspiracy should fear the anti-independence military deployment.
Li Weiyi, spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, also accuses Chen of being "immoral'' to gamble with the island's future to serve his own re-election bid and splittist agenda.
He points out that Chen's plan to hold the so-called "defensive referendum'' constitutes gross provocations against stability and peace in cross-Straits ties.
"What's most serious is that Chen has been colluding with separatist forces to actively engage in a pro-independence movement in an attempt to split Taiwan from the motherland,'' Li says.
Crushing pro-independence plot
"In the face of outrageous splittist activities we must make necessary preparations to resolutely crush any pro-independence plots.''
He notes that the difference in social systems between the two sides of the Straits cannot be used as an excuse to split the motherland.
In the face of Chen's stepped-up efforts to fuel cross-Straits tension through provocative moves, even the United States, the island's biggest arms supplier, was forced to send a stern warning to Taipei not to take any action towards independence.
Washington "opposes any unilateral decision'' by either side of the Taiwan Straits "to change the status quo,"said US President George W. Bush on December 9 while meeting visiting Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao.
When asked about the planned March 20 referendum on the island, Bush said: ".. the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose.''
His statement marks a distinct hardening of the usual US line that Washington "does not support'' independence moves by the island.
Regardless of the unprecedented rebuke from Washington, Chen reaffirmed his resolution to hold the "defensive referendum'' on March 20, arguing that he has no intention to change Taiwan's status quo.
Xu Shiquan, vice-chairman of the National Society of Taiwan Studies, describes Chen as a "new troublemaker,'' adding that the United States should learn an important lesson from his lack of political credibility.
The Taiwan leader has been engaging in creeping separatist activities despite his earlier pledge not to press for independence during his four-year term.
This double-dealing has well demonstrated that Chen has been flirting with Washington while counting on its support for his political ambitions, according to Xu Shiquan.
"It is high time that the US side knew the separatist forces led by Chen are just serving their own self-interests rather than the interests of Washington,'' the researcher says. He says Chen's insistence on the "defensive referendum'' plan suggested his penchant for brinkmanship in dealing with cross-Straits relations.
Chen has been bent on staging provocative acts to challenge the mainland's bottom line in a bid to woo votes in the "presidential'' elections, he adds.
The researcher urged Washington to stop selling arms to the island, which might be taken as a wrong signal by the separatist forces and be interpreted as US support for the island's pro-independence attempt.