Last updated at: (Beijing Time) Friday, September 05, 2003
Comment: Chen's 'Three Links' Plan Fails to Impress
Taiwan "president'' Chen Shui-bian's intention behind his recent clamour for direct cross-Straits trade, transport and postal links is essentially to serve his political ambitions.
Taiwan "president'' Chen Shui-bian's intention behind his recent clamour for direct cross-Straits trade, transport and postal links is essentially to serve his political ambitions.
Chen's recent three-stage programme for direct cross-Straits transportation and an assessment report on its impact were released in mid-August by the island's "cabinet'' -- the Executive Yuan. The main purpose of Chen's programme was to dominate the campaign for the forthcoming "presidential'' election and gain an advantage over the so-called pan-blue camp -- Chen's biggest political competitor, which has the Kuonmintang headed by Lien Chan and the People First Party led by James Soong at the core of the alliance.
Moreover, Chen's tactic of combining the "three links'' with his "one state on each side'' theory is mainly aimed at setting a fundamental framework for talks on the three links, to avoid being plunged into the allegedly mainland-designed trap of "one China.''
Chen insists that, in Taiwan's talks with the mainland, the island should not be "belittled, localized and marginalized'' and that the talks should be conducted in a way that maintains Taiwan's dignity, equality, and security. This has laid new obstacles to direct cross-Straits air and shipping transport or the rest of the three links with the mainland.
Chen's biggest weakness, which will possibly affect his "presidential'' election campaign, is his policy on cross-Straits relations and the three links.
The pan-blue camp, however, enjoys more advantages over Chen on this issue through playing the card of "maintaining stability across the Taiwan Straits'' and "opening three links with the mainland'' for a long period.
Chen's major rival has always strongly insisted that direct cross-Straits transportation should become part of the island's cross-Straits relations policy. The pan-blue camp has successfully pushed for the realization of charter flights during Spring Festival.
In its new election programme, the camp plans to take advantage of the three links issue to launch attacks against Chen.
By putting forward a three-stage programme for direct cross-Straits transportation and officially playing the three links card before Lien and Soong, Chen has attempted to break his political rivals' initiative on this issue.
In co-ordination with Chen's election tactics, the Executive Yuan also officially published an assessment report on the impact of direct cross-Straits air and sea links on August 15 to launch a public opinion offensive in an attempt to pursue support for Chen from the island's industrial and commercial circles and non-aligned voters.
It is obvious that Chen's schedule for direct cross-Straits transportation was based on consideration for his re-election tactics.
Just like his numerous policies and promises in the past, Chen's direct transportation programme would span beyond his current term of office.
The election is due on March 20 next year. According to Chen's programme, the period before then is the "preparatory'' stage for direct transportation. The second or "consultation'' stage is scheduled to take place after the election. The third stage is that of "realization,'' during which the necessary measures for direct cross-Straits transportation would be gradually put in place.
Such a schedule was arranged by Chen on the premise that he can be re-elected "president.'' The schedule's obvious purpose is that the island's voters should vote for Chen so that he can push for the three links and achieve direct transportation with the mainland.
The reason why Chen proposed that direct cross-Straits transportation be implemented after the election is that he definitely knows the goal cannot be achieved. It is impossible for his three links proposal, which has his "one state on each side'' theory at the core, to make headway before the election.
Chen's main purpose in attempting to bring about such an outcome was for to be re-elected.
In this situation, Chen thinks that the mainland will accept the election result and make concessions with his pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party in talks on direct transportation.
Chen's recent speeches and the Executive Yuan's report both demonstrate that Chen regards any attempt to conduct talks on direct transportation as being within the framework of his "one state on each side'' theory but not under the "one-China'' principle.
Since early July, Chen has told the US and Japanese media several times that he would by no means embrace the "one-China'' principle merely to achieve direct transportation with the mainland.
Due to Chen's direct combination of the three links with his "one state on each side'' theory, various circles on the island hold out little hope that direct cross-Straits transportation can be achieved in the near future.
Chen's attempt to gain support from the island's non-aligned voters and industrial and commercial circles by playing the three links card has had no obvious benefits for him.
First, the island's transport and industrial and commercial circles have shown a calm and rational attitude towards Chen's plea for direct transportation and the Executive Yuan's report.
Second, stock prices of transport companies have shown no signs of radical increases since the publication of the report. The volume of business has, on the contrary, decreased, demonstrating that investors do not have an optimistic attitude towards these companies' prospects.
A poll on the island said that, after Chen set out a schedule for direct air and shipping links with the mainland, 57 per cent of those questioned said they favour the authorities' policy of opening direct transport links but 60 per cent said they did not believe the links could be realized according to Chen's schedule.
By Wang Jianmin, a researcher with the Institute of Taiwan Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences