Last updated at: (Beijing Time) Thursday, August 28, 2003
Supervision by Central Inspection Team-- An Anti-Corruption Means
The 45 team members have all been in place and begun their inspection tours in Guizhou, Hunan and other provinces, performing their task of supervising provincial leadership. The inspection team planned to make a round tour of China's 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities within four years.
The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CPC and the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee recently set up their inspection office and team with the approval of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council. The 45 team members have all been in place and begun their inspection tours in Guizhou, Hunan and other provinces, performing their task of supervising provincial leadership. The inspection team planned to make a round tour of China's 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities within four years.
The action was seen as a deterrent to provincial or ministerial officials, and the inspectors were also viewed as "imperial envoys". But the nickname was negated by Li Yongzhong, director of the research office of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, when he said imperials envoys brought with them the will of the emperor, but the inspection team carry the will of the Party and the State.
The State has more than 2,000 provincial and ministerial cadres, including 1,000-plus taking frontline jobs, according to Professor Du Gangjian from the National School of Administration. In the past three years, about 16 to 17 officials "fell from their posts" annually on an average due to corruption, a proportion between 1 and 2 percent. Du estimated that the nation's anti-corruption efforts would be further strengthened in the latter half of this year.
The supervision over provincial cadres has been a headache for the State's decision-makers. In the eyes of Du, the supervisory effect is closely linked with the current systems. "Many effective supervision systems over officials of the lower level become ineffective at the provincial level, and neither the people's congress nor the discipline inspection commission within the province is able to effectively supervise provincial-level officials", thus forming a vast vacuum.
How can supervision penetrate into the vacuum? This has long remained a question. According to Li Qiang, sociology professor with Tsinghua University, due to a lack of effective mechanism to restrict regional and departmental powers, the number one local leader is likely to take upon himself all the decision-making, executive and supervisory powers; the power of local authorities thus evolved into certain personal power, while the absolute power becomes the root cause of corruption.
Theoretically, China's mechanism of supervision over leading cadres is sound, but it often encounters problems in practice. Discipline inspection commission under the local Party committee, people's congress and the local committee of the people's political consultative conference are all entitled to supervise the conducts of local leading cadres, but in fact, such supervision often appears to be weak.
"Supervision within organs of the same administrative level can hardly achieve notable results", said Li Yongzhong, "seeing the corruption of some provincial high officials, local discipline inspection commission and judicial organs often dare not, would not and can not interfere".
While direct supervision from the Central Discipline Inspection Commission usually lacks initiative and cannot guarantee its timeliness, in most cases, supervision can only be conducted afterwards.
In fact, since 1996 the Central Discipline Inspection Commission has begun to organize ministerial cadres for inspection tours to hear local voices. But since the inspectors were temporarily transferred from ministries or commissions, it is unavoidable that inspection work could only be done hurriedly and in a superficial manner. So, the setting up of the special inspection office and team, according to Li Yongzhong, can avoid temporariness and the lack of continuity, and guarantee special and regular inspection work.
But this is, after all, still an interim measure, and a long-term supervision system must coordinate with the nation's political and judicial systems. Li Yongzhong also takes it as a "transitional method", saying that to some extent, this is a method of high input but low output. The fundamental way is the improvement of the discipline inspection system requiring to be based on the development of inner-Party democracy.
In Li's opinion, the fundamental problems holding back inner-Party democracy and affecting supervision lie in the leadership of local Party committees that "combine legislation and execution". If the system is not changed, inner-Party democracy can hardly develop, inner-Party supervision can barely be carried out and inner-Party power can scarcely be balanced.