Last updated at: (Beijing Time) Monday, June 09, 2003
US Policy Toward Taiwan Swings to the Middle
After traversing a roundabout course, the Bush administration's Taiwan policy has by and large moved back to the policy of the previous six governments, but it still retains its own color. Some US scholars summed it up as a "double distinct" policy, this means a clear-cut stand on the two issues, one-China principle and "Taiwan defense".
Chinese President Hu Jintao met with US President George W. Bush when he attended the informal conversation conference of the North and South leaders in Evian, France on June 1. The Taiwan issue, the most important and most sensitive core issue in Sino-US relations, naturally could not be evaded in the meeting between leaders of the two countries.
President Hu pointed out that the fundamental reason why the situation in the straits region remains tense and cross-strait relations cannot be improved is that Taiwan authorities refuse to accept the one-China principle and "Taiwan independence" forces are still doing their utmost to carry out separatist activities. He expressed the hope that the United States would abide by its commitments, properly handle the Taiwan issue and not send a wrong signal to "Taiwan independence" forces.
President Bush indicated that the US government would continue to stick to the one-China policy, observe the three US-China joint communiques and oppose "Taiwan independence", this policy hasn't changed and will remain unchanged in the future.
Viewed from the attitude clearly stated by President Bush, US policy toward Taiwan is continuing the stand Bush expressed during his meeting with President Jiang Zemin last year, which swings to the middle and tends toward stability.
After President Bush entered and hosted the White House in 2001, under the pressure of the Republican Party's pro-Taiwan conservative forces, Bush's Taiwan policy for a time deviated from the policy of the US governments of the previous six terms, moving drastically to the "right".
In April 2001, the United States announced the case of the largest arms sale to Taiwan since 1992, promising to sell to Taiwan advanced offensive weapons including eight submarines, thus grossly trampling upon the spirit of the "August 17 communique". Bush himself had made a slip of the tongue when he said about "adopting all possible means to defend Taiwan". Meanwhile, the US government upgraded its courteous reception of Taiwan authorities' leaders "in transit" and relaxed its restrictions on visits by high-ranking Taiwan officials to the United States, US military also promoted its ties with the Taiwan military, particularly in the aspect of the "integration" in the command and management system.
On the one-China question, the United States, using the "Taiwan Relations Act" of interference in China's internal affairs as a pretext, fell back from the stand of the three Sino-US joint communiques.
Some US scholars have pointed out that after it took office the Bush administration inverted the policy of the Clinton administration on the two key issues of one China and the "defense" of Taiwan, the Clinton administration's one-China policy was distinct, its core content was the "three no's" (not supporting Taiwan independence and "two-Chinas or one China, one Taiwan", nor supporting Taiwan's participation in the international organizations of sovereign states), while it maintained "strategic confusion" on the issue of the "defense" of Taiwan; the Bush administration made the "defense" of Taiwan distinct, while at the same time obscured its one-China policy stance.
What effect, after all, has oscillation of the Bush administration's policy toward Taiwan produced? That is, it has given a wrong signal to the separatist forces of Taiwan. For a while, "Taiwan independence" elements were jubilant over this, they made speeches and wrote articles everywhere, preaching that the United States not only would sell them the weapons they wanted, but also would not hesitate to battle against the Chinese mainland to "defend" Taiwan, thinking that they could feel relieved and boldly engage in divisive activities.
It was against such a background that Chen Shui-bian brazenly dished out the "theory of one country on each side" (of the straits), causing the reemergence of the crisis in the strait region. This naturally irritated the United States. US policy toward Taiwan, after all, serves the interest of the United States, not Taiwan.
US Taiwan policy has always aimed to maintain a no-unification, no-independence and no-war status on both sides of the straits. In the United States there is invariably a force that takes Taiwan as a bargaining chip used to contain China's development. Up to now, the US government still refuses or avoids expressing its attitude of support for the reunification of the two sides of the straits.
However, the United States also tries its best to avoid being drawn into an armed conflict because of the Taiwan issue. As a result, contrary to the expectations of "Taiwan independence" elements, previous US governments played dual tactics toward Taiwan authorities.
On the one hand, they tried hard to maintain a state of division between the two sides of the straits and obstruct their reunification, through selling arms to Taiwan, they caused the latter "to resist reunification by force"; on the other hand, they did not allow Taiwan authorities to legally practice "Taiwan independence", to challenge the one China principle and ignite the flame of war on both sides of the straits.
Cool-headed Taiwan scholars pointed out that the US policy of "protecting" Taiwan is aimed at "Taiwan defense", not "defending Taiwan". That is to say, the United States wants to turn Taiwan into a chess in the East Asian strategic arrangement through arms sales to Taiwan and to incorporate the command and management system of Taiwan troops into the US military system, once contingencies arise in the Taiwan Straits region, Taiwan would become a pawn placed in the frontline of the United States.
After traversing a roundabout course, the Bush administration's Taiwan policy has by and large moved back to the policy of the previous six governments, but it still retains its own color. Some US scholars summed it up as a "double distinct" policy, this means a clear-cut stand on the two issues, one-China principle and "Taiwan defense".
In the future, it will continue to pursue a one-China policy, give no support to "Taiwan independence"; at the same time, it will continue to sell arms to Taiwan under the pretext of the "Taiwan Relations Act", so as to maintain the no-unification, no-independence and no-war state on both sides of the straits.
Within the tenure of office of the Bush administration, no major oscillation will occur to this policy. The Taiwan issue will remain the most sensitive and most kernel question affecting the healthy development of Sino-US relations.
However, the foreign policy of any country will evolve along with change in the international situation and the adjustment of the frame of state relations. The United States will sooner or later come to realize that removing the obstacle of the Taiwan issue and developing constructive relations of cooperation with China are in the best interests of the United States.