The over 2,000-year-old Sino-Japan relations, after going through the process of "strong China and weak Japan" and "strong Japan and weak China", are now developing toward a relationship between the strong.

At least for the moment, neither side of the two is the "weak", this situation, when entangled with historical issues, would possibly lead to a situation in which none of the two sides would show its weakness. Because compromise made in the course of representation by any government of the two sides might be seen as a sign of "weakness" by some people, which constitutes quite a big pressure.

Future Sino-Japanese relationship as one between two strong countries would take the following three forms: First, both governments would take a steady and cooperative stand in handling bilateral relations; second, both governments would adopt a tough and confrontation-inclined stance in dealing with bilateral ties; third, one government would take a relatively steady and cooperative stand, while the other government would adopt a tough or relatively tough stand in handling relations between the two countries.

In recent years, Sino-Japan relationship has tended to take the third form: The Japanese government's attitude toward China, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and other neighboring countries has become increasingly intransigent. Particularly since the beginning of 2005, Japan has sent out a strong diplomatic signal on the issues such as Chinese Diaoyu Islands, ROK's Dokdo as well as Russia's northern territory, this cannot but make people look at Japan's acts with new eyes.

A sensible diplomatic policy, of course, should not make each other enemies, nor push the other side to one's opposite. However, currently China is no long a weak nation that can be oppressed and exploited by anyone. When facing Japan's tough foreign policies, China can never budge an inch. It can be said that Japan's hard-line policies are misleading the Japanese and agitating the feeling of Chinese, and are thus guiding the two countries to confrontation. If the relations between the two countries further deteriorate, the two sides may face the historic choice between "no more fighting" and "renewal of fighting". Uncertain factors between China and Japan are increasing, then, how big is the possibility for a confrontation between China and Japan as one between two strong countries?

Viewed from Japanese political circles of today, the government, whichever it is, will put Japan's national interest in the first place.

As a country exceedingly short of natural resources, industrialized Japan depends heavily on foreign resources and shipping lines. Meanwhile, as Japan is engaged in extensive trade and investment activities across the world, it is highly dependent on foreign markets, due to the long-term activities mentioned above, Japan has accumulated phenomenal overseas economic benefits worldwide. In brief, the procurement of foreign resources, shipping lines, as well as foreign markets and overseas economic benefits can be called Japan's lifeblood or the source of life, and here lie Japan's national interests.

China may have dealings with Japan mainly in the following aspects relating to the aforementioned Japanese "national interests":

I. China and Japan are likely to involve themselves in competition for foreign resources, especially crude oil and natural gas.

II. China and Japan may engage in competition when exploiting seabed resources in the East China Sea. The competition is entangled with disputes between China and Japan on sovereignty over certain islands and the demarcation of sea areas.

III. Japan worries that the Taiwan issue might affect the safety of its shipping lines in the region. To be specific, on the one hand Japan fears that some important section of its shipping lines would be placed under China's control if Beijing realized national reunification; on the other hand, Japan worries that if "something" happens across the Taiwan Straits, it will for a while also affect Japan's marine transportation, and even affect its southwest islands and waters.

IV. In terms of foreign markets, although competition exists between China and Japan, however, with the development of bilateral trade and economic relations and the integration of industrialization of the two countries (the deepening of division of labor within the industry), the complementarity of the two countries' economies has been enhanced instead of weakened, particularly when Japanese industry is increasingly dependent on the vast Chinese market.

V. With regard to overseas economic benefits, along with the deepening of the two countries' economic interdependence and the integration of their industrialization, Japan's overseas economic benefits accumulated on the vast land of China are on the increase.

The above analysis shows that the national interest and strategic interest of China and Japan are not completely opposite. It can be said that along with the deepening of the two countries' economic interdependence, the connective part of the two countries' interests will increase and not decrease. A solution of contradiction by the method of confrontation can only lead to the loss and suffering of both sides. For instance, in regard to the exploitation of seabed resources in the East China Sea and the security of marine transportation lines, confrontation between the two sides will possibly cause a disastrous consequence to both sides.

Based on the above-mentioned situation, the tough foreign policies adopted by the Koizumi administration toward neighboring countries, China in particular, carry, to a great extent, a subjective color and emotional factor. But this practice has met with ever-louder voice of opposition in Japan, and the above-mentioned foreign policies have been landed in a serious predicament. From various perspectives, "the Koizumi administration has entered a blind alley," commented a representative of the Democratic Party, the largest opposition party in Japan. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has met with ever-stronger opposition even from within the Liberal Democratic Party. Criticism of Koizumi's domestic and foreign policies has prompted a "movement to bring down the cabinet" which is brewing within the Liberal Democratic Party, thereby putting unprecedented pressure on Koizumi since he took office.

It can thus be predicted that with the development of China and change in the international environment, there is little possibility for Sino-Japanese relationship to move toward such a state of confrontation as one between two strong countries. Furthermore, a basic task of diplomacy is, through tenacious diplomatic efforts, to make the policy of the other country develop in the direction favorable to one's own country. As Japan's neighbor, China, of course, will not give up such efforts, especially efforts to win over the majority of Japan; to be exact, to win over Japanese nationals, which will play a role through Japan's internal cause, so that Tokyo will not deviate from the road of peaceful development which it has followed since WWII.

The author is a research fellow with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Carried on Page 15 of the Global Times April 6, 2005, the above article is translated by People's Daily Online